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Abstract
A private information retrieval (PIR) scheme allows a user to retrieve a file from a database without
revealing any information on the file being requested. As of now, PIR schemes have been proposed for
several kinds of storage systems, including replicated and MDS-coded data. In this paper, the problem
of constructing a PIR scheme on regenerating codes is considered.
A regenerating code is a storage code whose codewords are distributed among n nodes, enabling
efficient storage of files, as well as low-bandwidth retrieval of files and repair of nodes. In this work, a PIR
scheme on regenerating codes is constructed, using the product-matrix (PM) framework of Rashmi, Shah
and Kumar. Both the minimum-bandwidth (MBR) and minimum-storage (MSR) settings are considered,
and the structure given by the PM framework is used in order to reduce the download communication
complexity of our schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval (PIR) allows a user to retrieve a file from a storage system without
revealing what file she is interested in. The problem of constructing PIR schemes was introduced by
Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan [1], [2], where data was considered to be replicated on multiple
servers. In the first model, it was assumed that the data is a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}m, and the user would
∗: Both authors contributed equally to this manuscript.
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2like to retrieve a bit xf without revealing the index f to the servers. Since its introduction, much work
has been done on the replicated data model [3]–[7]. The asymptotic capacity for a PIR scheme over a
storage system where the files are replicated on n servers was found to be 1− 1/n [3].
On the other hand, there is a lot of interest in using codes for storage in order to minimize storage
overhead. As a consequence, many works also considered the PIR model where the data is not replicated
but coded and distributed over multiple servers, see e.g. [8]–[16]. The asymptotic capacity for a PIR
scheme for a storage system where the files are coded on multiple servers using an [n, k] MDS code
was found to be 1− k/n [10]. The present work will focus on the case of regenerating codes as storage
codes.
Regenerating codes are a class of codes dedicated to distributed storage, achieving the optimal tradeoff
between the bandwidth needed for a node repair and the amount of data each node needs to store.
These codes were pioneered by Dimakis et al. [17] who notably produced a cut-set bound on the
parameters of the codes. This bound materializes two interesting optimal settings: one for which the repair
communication cost in minimized, called the minimum-bandwidth regenerating (MBR) point, and one
for which the nodes store the least data, called the minimum-storage regenerating (MSR) point. Rashmi
et al. [18] then proposed optimal constructions for these two specific settings, based on the so-called
product-matrix (PM) framework. Many other works followed, including [19]–[21] for the construction
of MBR/MSR codes. Also notice that security against eavesdroppers in regenerating codes have been
intensively studied, e.g. in [22], [23].
In this paper, we propose PIR schemes for the optimal PM constructions of Rashmi et al. [18] in
both MBR and MSR settings. The protocols we give use the symmetry and the redundancy inherent
to the PM constructions, in order to decrease the number of symbols downloaded from the servers. As
a consequence, we outperform the very recent constructions of PIR schemes over PM codes given by
Dorkson and Ng in [24], [25], which represent the only existing works on PIR schemes for MBR/MSR
codes, to the best of our knowledge.
Concerning PM-MBR codes, we obtain a PIR rate strictly larger than 1 − kn , where n is the total
number of servers and k is the smallest number of servers it is necessary to contact in order to retrieve
a file in a regenerating code. This can be compared to the capacity of scalar [n, k] MDS-coded PIR
schemes for an unbounded number of messages, which is exactly 1 − kn [9], [10]. Thus, this presents
another incentive to use MBR codes for storage systems. It is important to note that, though our result
might seem contradictory, PM codes are vector codes, hence the bound in [9], [10] does not apply. In
this work, the PIR rate we obtain remains below 1− kn + k(k−1)2nd , which can be considered as an upper
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3bound on the capacity of PIR schemes based on (n, k, d) MBR codes1.
In the PM-MSR setting, we construct a PIR scheme similar to the scheme in the PM-MBR setting,
where we consider d = 2k − 2 for simplicity. The PIR scheme achieves a PIR rate which is between
1 − d/n, the rate obtained by Dorkson and Ng [24] which is also the PIR capacity of an [n, d] MDS
code, and 1− k/n, the PIR capacity of an [n, k] MDS code.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation and definitions
For a, b ∈ Fnq , we denote their inner product by 〈a, b〉 :=
∑n
i=1 aibi ∈ Fq and their component-wise
(star) product by a ? b := (a1b1, . . . , anbn) ∈ Fnq . For I ⊂ [1, n], we denote by a|I the tuple obtained by
restricting a to coordinates in I . The Reed-Solomon code of dimension k with distinct evaluation points
x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi ∈ Fq, is defined by
RSk(x) := {(f(x1), . . . , f(xn)), f ∈ Fq[X], deg f ≤ k − 1} ⊆ Fnq .
It is well-known that for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the code RSk(x) is maximum-distance separable (MDS),
and that RSj(x) ⊆ RSk(x) for every j ≤ k. Therefore there exists a basis Γ = {γ1, . . . ,γk} of
RSk(x), such that, for every j ≤ k and every subset I ⊂ [1, n] for cardinality |I| ≥ j, the family
Γ(I,j) := {(γ1)|I , . . . , (γj)|I} is a basis of RSj(x|I) ⊆ F|I|q . For instance, one can take a degree-ordered
monomial basis, explicitly given by γj := (x
j
1, . . . , x
j
n) ∈ Fnq .
Throughout this paper, we will refer to the asymptotic PIR capacity simply as the PIR capacity, as
this is the only definition of PIR capacity we consider.
The Vandermonde matrix with distinct basis elements x ∈ Fnq is the n× k matrix Ψ ∈ Fn×kq such that
Ψi,j = x
j
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ k. We know that Ψ generates the code RSk(x) by columns. More
precisely, these columns form the monomial basis we mentioned earlier.
The nomenclature used in this paper is summarized in the following table.
B. Private information retrieval
Consider a scheme between a user and n servers storing an encoded version of F files X1, . . . ,XF . In
the scheme, queries Q[1], . . . ,Q[n] are sent to servers, which in return compute responses R[1], . . . ,R[n]
accordingly. Now, assume the user wants to retrieve a specific file Xf0 , for 1 ≤ f0 ≤ F . We say the
1Indeed, under the constraint β = 1, a PM-MBR code is an [nd,B] linear code over Fq , where B = kd− k(k−1)2 . Moreover
it is known that 1− B
nd
is an upper bound on the PIR capacity of an [nd,B] linear code with such parameters, since it is the
capacity of an [nd,B] MDS code [10].
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4TABLE I
NOMENCLATURE
C Regenerating code
F Number of files
n Number of servers
k Reconstruction parameter of the regenerating code
d Repair parameter of the regenerating code
B Number of symbols in a regenerating codeword
α Storage capacity of a single server
β Repair-bandwidth of a single server
X = (X1, . . . ,XF ) Set of files (database)
Xf0 Specific file requested by the user
Mf Redundant arrangement of file Xf in a matrix, as in the PM framework
Cf Regenerating codeword associated to Xf , as stored on the DSS
Cf [·, ·, s] s-th stripe of codeword Cf
Cf [i, ·, s] Sub-array of Cf [·, ·, s] stored by i-th server
Cf [i, j, s] j-th Fq-symbol of sub-array Cf [i, ·, s]
Q` `-th query sent to servers
R Rate of a PIR scheme
H(·) Entropy function
scheme achieves information-theoretic PIR against non-colluding servers, if the following requirements
hold:
Privacy: H(f0 | Q[i]) = H(f0), i = 1, . . . , n.
Recovery: H(Xf0 | R[1], . . . ,R[n]) = 0 .
Here, H(·) denoted the entropy function. Concerning the recovery constraint, it is also desirable that the
user is able to reconstruct Xf0 explicitly from R[1], . . . ,R[n]. Finally, we define the (download) PIR
rate of a scheme by R := |X
f0 |∑
i |R[i]| where | · | represents the bitsize of a vector. The PIR capacity is the
maximum achievable PIR rate.
C. Regenerating codes
Regenerating codes were introduced by Dimakis et al. in the context of distributed storage [17]. In an
(n, k, d,B, α, β) regenerating code, a coded version of a file of size B is stored on n servers (or nodes),
each storing α symbols. Besides, two additional constraints are required. The first is to give any external
user the ability to retrieve the file by contacting any subset of k servers. The second is to allow repair
of any failed server by contacting any subset of d ≥ k servers and downloading β symbols from each,
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5i.e., γ := βd symbols in total. Parameters of regenerating codes are sometimes shortly denoted (n, k, d),
but one should take care that d is not the minimum distance of the code, and k is not the dimension of
the code.
Dimakis et al. [17] proved that any storage (erasure) code must satisfy the so-called cut-set bound
B ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (d− i)β} , (1)
and codes achieving this bound are called regenerating codes. Dimakis et al. also showed that equality
in (1) defines a tradeoff between parameters α and γ = βd, which cannot be minimized simultaneously.
Optimal codes minimizing γ = βd reach the minimum-bandwidth regeneration (MBR) point, while those
minimizing α attain the minimum-storage regeneration (MSR) point.
D. Product-Matrix constructions
In this work, we focus on the regenerating codes built by Rashmi et al. in [18], through the product-
matrix (PM) framework. In their constructions, the authors set β = 1 without loss of generality, since
regenerating codes with β 6= 1 can be built by striping files in regenerating codes with β = 1. Therefore,
for convenience we also consider the setting β = 1 in what follows.
1) PM codes in the MBR setting: At the MBR point with β = 1, we have the following constraints
on the parameters:
α = d and B = k(d− k) + k(k + 1)
2
.
The construction of Rashmi et al. [18] can be presented as follows. Firstly, file (message) symbols are
arranged in a d× d matrix
M =
 S T
T> 0
 (2)
where S is a k × k symmetric matrix containing k(k+1)2 distinct file symbols, and T is a k × (d − k)
matrix containing the remaining k(d−k) file symbols. Let now Ψ be an n×d Vandermonde matrix over
a large enough finite field Fq. The code is defined as C := ΨM ∈ Fn×dq . The j-th row of a codeword
in C is stored on server Sj , for j = 1, . . . , n, and contains at most α = d information symbols. Notice
that C is an [nd,B] linear code over Fq. For clarity, let us now rewrite the example given by the authors
in [18, Sec. IV.A.].
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6Example 1 (Optimal PM-MBR code). Consider the setting (n, k, d) = (6, 3, 4) over the field F7. The
original file contains B = k(d− k) + k(k+1)2 = 9 symbols. Let x = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) ∈ F67. The generator
(Vandermonde) matrix and the message matrix are then given as:
Ψ =

1 1 1 1
1 2 4 1
1 3 2 6
1 4 2 1
1 5 4 6
1 6 1 6

, M =

m1 m2 m3 m7
m2 m4 m5 m8
m3 m5 m6 m9
m7 m8 m9 0
 .
2) PM codes in the MSR setting: In the MSR setting with β = 1, parameters α and B are given by:
α = d− k + 1 and B = k(d− k + 1) .
In [18], the authors construct PM codes at the MSR point, for d ≥ 2k − 2. In this setting, d ≤ 2α
and B ≤ α(α + 1). In this work, for simplicity, we assume d = 2k − 2 as it is the case for the first
construction given in [18]. Thus, d and B can be simplified as d = 2α and B = α(α+ 1). Note that the
scheme we propose further in Section IV can be easily generalized to the case where d ≥ 2k − 2.
File symbols are arranged in a 2α× α matrix
M =
S1
S2

where each Si is an α × α symmetric matrix containing α(α+1)2 file symbols. Let Ψ be an n × 2α
Vandermonde matrix over Fq. As in the MBR setting, the j-th row of a codeword from the code C := ΨM
is stored on server Sj , for j = 1, . . . , n.
This construction is referred to as PM-MSR codes. Let us also rewrite the example given in [18, Sec.
V.A.].
Example 2 (Optimal PM-MSR code). Consider the setting (n, k, d) = (6, 3, 4) over F13, which gives
the file size B = 6. Let x = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) ∈ F613. Matrices Ψ and M are then given by:
Ψ =

1 1 1 1
1 2 4 8
1 3 9 1
1 4 3 12
1 5 12 8
1 6 10 8

, M =

m1 m2
m2 m3
m4 m5
m5 m6
 .
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7III. A PIR SCHEME IN THE MBR SETTING
In this section, we consider a PM-MBR code C over Fq, with parameters (n, k, d). Recall that C is
also a linear code over Fq of length nd and dimension B = k(d− k) + k(k+1)2 .
A. System setup
We consider a database X composed of F files X1, . . . ,XF , such that each Xf consists of B =
k(d − k) + k(k+1)2 information symbols. For every 1 ≤ f ≤ F , the symbols of file Xf are subdivided
into S ≥ 1 stripes (or subdivisions) and organized in a 3-dimensional array M f (that we abusively name
a matrix), such that
M f =
Mf [i, j, s], 1 ≤ i ≤ d1 ≤ j ≤ d
1 ≤ s ≤ S
 ∈ Fd×d×Sq ,
where for every i, j, s, f , we have Mf [i, j, s] ∈ Fq. Following the PM framework, every stripe M f [·, ·, s]
must the form given in (2). Also notice that, by construction of the regenerating code C, for all i, j, s, f ,
we have:
Mf [i, j, s] = Mf [j, i, s] ,
and
Mf [i, j, s] = 0 if i ≥ k + 1 and j ≥ k + 1 .
We also use the notation M := (M1, . . . ,MF ).
For every j, s, f , the columnM f [·, j, s] ∈ Fdq is encoded using a Reed-Solomon code RSd(x), resulting
in a codeword
Cf [·, j, s] =
d∑
r=1
Mf [r, j, s]γr,
where we recall that Γ = {γ1, . . . ,γd} denotes a suitable basis for sequences of Reed-Solomon codes (see
Section II-A). Due to the form of message matrices M f , one can also remark that Cf [·, j, s] ∈ RSk(x)
if j ≥ k + 1.
B. Intuition
The idea behind the constructed PIR scheme is to use the symmetric property of matrices M f as a
way to reuse information in order to decrease the download complexity of the scheme. We note that
the servers are assumed not to collude. In this scheme, each file is divided into S = n− k stripes. The
user generates a set of k queries to the servers, similarly to the scheme in [13]. A query is defined as
an n × S × F vector that is sent by the user to retrieve information. Randomness is embedded in the
December 7, 2018 DRAFT
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d
S
the coded message
Cf+2 ∈ CS
associated to file Xf+2
S-th stripe
Cf+1[·, ·, S] ∈ C
codeword
Cf [·, d, 1] ∈ RSd(x)
in d-th column
and 1st stripe
C[1, ·, ·],
the data stored by
server S1
Fig. 1. An illustration of the arrangement of files, stripes and codewords in the storage system. A system of n servers stores
encoded files represented by S × d × n cuboids (in the figure, only three of them are represented). Foreground (red) blocks
represent data stored by the first server. The horizontal block (in green) in the middle cuboid represents a stripe, which lies in
the regenerating code C. Top right block (in blue) is a column of a stripe, and typically lies in an MDS code.
queries as a way to hide the requested file’s identity, in a similar manner to one-time padding. Naturally,
if privacy were not a concern, a query to retrieve file Xf0 would be the vector of size n× S × F with
zeroes everywhere, except in positions f = f0 corresponding to the requested file.
The queries are then sent to the servers which project queries on their stored data the following manner.
For the last d− k columns, since each of these columns stores file stripes encoded using an [n, k] MDS
code, servers are asked to project all the queries on the data they hold, similarly to [13]. For each of
the other columns, stripes contain information already retrieved from the previously used columns, due
to the nature of the product-matrix construction. Thus, from server Sd down to server S1, servers are
asked to project on their stored data a decreasing subset of the initial set of queries. This still enables
the user to reconstruct the requested file, due to the fact that she had peeled off some randomness and
information symbols from previous columns. Moreover, it allows her to run a more efficient PIR scheme
on an [n, k′] MDS code with where k′ < k. More details are given in the upcoming sections.
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9C. The PIR scheme
In this section, we describe the PIR scheme explicitly. Let us assume that the user wants to retrieve a
file Xf0 , for some 1 ≤ f0 ≤ F . We fix the number of stripes to S = n− k, and we consider a k-tuple
of queries Q = (Q1, . . . ,Qk), such that for 1 ≤ ` ≤ k, query Q` has the following form:
Q` =
Qf` [i, s], 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 ≤ s ≤ S
1 ≤ f ≤ F
 .
Notice that, since the same set of queries is meant to be used for every column, query Q` does not
depend on a column index j ∈ [1, d]. This property is fundamental for the privacy of the scheme.
The sub-query Qf` [i, ·] is then sent to server Si, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The response R`[i, j] ∈ Fq of
server Si with respect to the pair (`, j), is then defined as:
R`[i, j] := 〈Q`[i, ·],C[i, j, ·]〉 =
∑
s,f
Qf` [i, s]C
f [i, j, s] .
We also denote by R`[·, j] := (R`[1, j], . . . , R`[n, j]) ∈ Fnq .
Generation of Q. The random tuple of queries Q is defined as the sum of two components.
1) A random part D, defined as follows. For every `, s, f , a symbol λ`,s,f ∈ Fq is picked uniformly at
random and independently of others. Then, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we define:
Df` [i, s] = λ`,s,f .
In other words, Df` [·, s] ∈ Fnq is a word picked uniformly at random in the repetition code of
length n.
2) A deterministic part E(f0), also called the retrieval pattern. This pattern is defined by:
E
(f0),f
` [i, s] =
 1 if f = f0 and n− i = `+ s− 2 (mod S),0 otherwise.
Finally, the tuple of queries Q is defined by Q := D+E(f0). Notice here that each query is sent to the
servers by hiding the deterministic part with a random vector. Therefore, the privacy of the scheme still
holds.
Server responses to queries. We now assume that Q[i, ·] is sent to server Si, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In the proposed protocol, the set of responses required by the user depend on the index j ∈ [1, d] of the
column, as described below:
• For columns k + 1 ≤ j ≤ d, every server Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, must send back to the user the responses
R`[i, j], where 1 ≤ ` ≤ k .
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• For columns 1 ≤ j ≤ k, only servers Si such that k− j + 1 ≤ i ≤ n are required to respond to the
user. Those servers Si must compute and send the subset of responses R`[i, j], such that 1 ≤ ` ≤ j.
We here emphasize that, for these first columns 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the subset of servers Si, i ∈ [k − j + 1, n],
send the subset of responses R`[i, j], ` ∈ [1, j] to the user. This is a key point in order to achieve a good
PIR rate — see Example 3 for an illustration.
Reconstruction of Xf0 . The recovery is run columnwise, from column d down to column 1. For each
step j, 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the goal is to retrieve M f0 [·, j, ·] along with some random vectors.
• For k + 1 ≤ j ≤ d. A precise description of the recovery algorithm is given in the proof of
Lemma 1. In short, it consists of running, independently on each column C[·, j, ·], the reconstruction
of the PIR scheme over an MDS code described in [13]. Indeed, each C[·, j, ·] can be viewed as
a smaller database encoded and stored in an [n, k] MDS storage system. This procedure allows
the user to recover M f0 [·, j, ·], but one should notice that she can also collect random vectors∑
s,f M
f [r, j, s]Df` [·, s] ∈ Fnq , for all 1 ≤ r, ` ≤ k.
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ k. At step j, we can assume that for every j′ ≥ j + 1, the user has already collected
– M f0 [·, j′, ·] and
– the random vectors
∑
s,f M
f [r, j′, s]Df` [·, s] ∈ Fn−k+min{k,j
′}
q for every 1 ≤ r, ` ≤ min{k, j′}.
Recall that Mf [r, j′, s] = Mf [j′, r, s] and that every Df` [·, s] lies in a repetition code. As a
consequence, the user knows
∑
s,f M
f [r, j, s]Df` [·, s] ∈ Fn−k+min{k,j
′}
q for every j + 1 ≤ r ≤ d
and every 1 ≤ ` ≤ j. The retrieval process described in the proof of Lemma 2 then ensures that the
user can retrieve M f0 [·, j, ·] and the random vectors ∑s,f Mf [r, j, s]Df` [·, s] ∈ Fn−k+jq for every
1 ≤ r, ` ≤ j.
We start by giving a simple example before diving into technical proofs.
Example 3. We use the (6, 3, 4) PM-MBR regenerating code described in Example 1. For this purpose,
the files are divided into S = n− k = 3 stripes, and the user sends k = 3 query vectors:
Query 1 Query 2 Query 3
Server S1 u v w
Server S2 u v w
Server S3 u v w
Server S4 u+ ef0,1 v + ef0,2 w + ef0,3
Server S5 u+ ef0,2 v + ef0,3 w + ef0,1
Server S6 u+ ef0,3 v + ef0,1 w + ef0,2
December 7, 2018 DRAFT
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where ef0,s0 ∈ FF×Sq is the deterministic vector with all zeros, but one 1 in position (f0, s0), which
corresponds to stripe s0 of what is stored from file Xf0 . Vectors u,v,w ∈ FF×Sq are uniformly random
vectors.
The servers project the data stored in columns 3 and 4 on all the queries. Server S1 does not respond
to any other queries. Servers S2, . . . , S6 project only the first 2 queries on the data stored in their second
column. Server S2 does not respond to any other queries. Servers S3, . . . , S6 project only the first query
on the data stored in column 1. Then the servers send this information back to the user.
• Decodability: In this example d− k = 1. For the last row, the user receives the responses from all
three queries from all six servers. The storage code for the last row is a [6, 3] MDS code. If we look at
the responses to the first query from the last column, it will be:
Response 1
S1
∑F
f=1
∑3
s=1 uf,s(M
f [1, 4, s] +Mf [2, 4, s] +Mf [3, 4, s])
S2
∑F
f=1
∑3
s=1 uf,s(M
f [1, 4, s] + 2Mf [2, 4, s] + 4Mf [2, 4, s])
S3
∑F
f=1
∑3
s=1 uf,s(M
f [1, 4, s] + 3Mf [2, 4, s] + 2Mf [3, 4, s])
S4
∑F
f=1
∑3
s=1 uf,s(M
f [1, 4, s] + 4Mf [2, 4, s] + 2Mf [3, 4, s]) +M1[1, 4, 1] + 4M1[2, 4, 1] + 2M1[3, 4, 1]
S5
∑F
f=1
∑3
s=1 uf,s(M
f [1, 4, s] + 5Mf [2, 4, s] + 4Mf [3, 4, s]) +M1[1, 4, 2] + 5M1[2, 4, 2] + 4M1[3, 4, 2]
S6
∑F
f=1
∑3
s=1 uf,s(M
f [1, 4, s] + 6Mf [2, 4, s] +Mf [3, 4, s]) +M1[1, 4, 3] + 6M1[2, 4, 3] + 1M1[3, 4, 3]
From the above table, we can see that the user can recover the three random symbols
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
uf,sM
f [1, 4, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
uf,sM
f [2, 4, s]
and
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
uf,sM
f [3, 4, s],
along with the three required symbols
M1[1, 4, 1],M1[2, 4, 2],M1[3, 4, 3].
Following the same reasoning, from the second and third queries the user can retrieve the random symbols
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
vf,sM
f [1, 4, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
wf,sM
f [1, 4, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
vf,sM
f [2, 4, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
wf,sM
f [2, 4, s]
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and
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
vf,sM
f [3, 4, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
wf,sM
f [3, 4, s],
along with the required symbols,
M1[1, 4, 2],M1[2, 4, 3],M1[3, 4, 1],M1[1, 4, 3],M1[2, 4, 1],M1[3, 4, 2].
Notice that the PIR scheme run over the fourth column achieves a PIR rate of 3/6.
For the third column, the storage code is a [6, 4] MDS code. Recall that M f [3, 4, ·] = M f [4, 3, ·] for
every f , and the user has already collected information in the responses from column 4. As a consequence,
the user knows the vector M1[4, 3, ·] as well as the random symbols
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
uf,sM
f [4, 3, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
vf,sM
f [4, 3, s]
and
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
wf,sM
f [4, 3, s].
Therefore, the responses from the third column allow the user to decode the symbols, just like the responses
from the last column. The user, thus, recovers M1[1, 3, ·], M1[2, 3, ·], and M1[3, 3, ·] with a rate 3/6.
For the second column, the storage code is also a [6, 4] MDS code, but the user can use the infor-
mation she collected from columns 3 and 4. More precisely, the user already knows vectors M1[2, 3, ·],
M1[2, 4, ·], and random symbols
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
uf,sM
f [2, 3, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
uf,sM
f [2, 4, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
vf,sM
f [2, 3, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
uf,sM
f [2, 4, s]
and
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
wf,sM
f [2, 3, s],
F∑
f=1
3∑
s=1
wf,sM
f [2, 4, s].
Thus, the user does not need the response from server S1 in order to decode the symbols. It means
that the code can be assumed to be reduced to a [5, 2] MDS code. The user can then decode the parts
M1[1, 2, ·], and M1[2, 2, ·] from servers S2, . . . , S6 and from the first 2 queries, with rate 6/10 = 3/5.
Following the same reasoning for the first column, the user needs only the responses of servers
S3, . . . , S6 to the first query only. The storage code can be seen as a [4, 1] MDS code on those servers,
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after introducing the already known information. This allows the user to decode the last part of the file,
M1[1, 1, ·], with rate 3/4.
Finally, the PIR rate of the scheme in this example is RMBR = 3+6+9+94+10+18+18 =
27
50 = 0.54. We see this
rate is larger than 1− kn = 1− 36 = 12 = 0.5 which is the capacity of scalar MDS-coded PIR schemes,
but less than 1− Bnd = 1− 96×4 = 58 = 0.625, which is an upper bound on the capacity of [nd,B]-coded
PIR schemes.
• Privacy: Privacy follows from the fact that for any fixed desired file, every server gets a uniform
random vector as a query.
D. Analysis
We next prove the correctness of the PIR scheme proposed in previous section.
Lemma 1. Let k+ 1 ≤ j ≤ d. Then, conditioned on (R1[·, j], . . . ,Rk[·, j]), the following is determined:
• the piece M f0 [·, j, ·] of the desired file;
• the random vectors
∑
s,f M
f [r, j, s]Df` [·, s] ∈ Fnq for every 1 ≤ r, ` ≤ k.
Proof. Let us fix 1 ≤ ` ≤ k. After receiving responses from servers, the user is able to build the response
vector
R`[·, j] := (R`[1, j], . . . , R`[n, j]) ∈ Fnq .
Notice that we have
R`[·, j] =
∑
s,f
Df` [·, s] ?Cf [·, j, s] +
∑
s
E
(f0),f0
` [·, s] ?Cf0 [·, j, s] .
We can now define
B`[·, j] :=
∑
s
E
(f0),f0
` [·, s] ?Cf0 [·, j, s] ∈ Fnq ,
and we see that
B`[i, j] =
 Cf0 [i, j, s′] if i ≥ k + 1,0 otherwise, (3)
where s′ ∈ [1, k] satisfies n− i = (`+s′−2 mod n−k). In particular B`[·, j] is supported on [k+1, n],
and therefore has weight at most n− k.
Now, denote by
A`[·, j] :=
∑
s,f
Df` [·, s] ?Cf [·, j, s] ∈ Fnq .
Since every Df` [·, s] belongs to the repetition code and Cf [·, j, s] ∈ RSk(x), it holds that A`[·, j] ∈
RSk(x). We have also seen that R`[i, j] = A`[i, j] for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, thus the user knows the k first symbols
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of A`[·, j]. Since [1, k] is an information set for RSk(x), she can recover A`[·, j] entirely. The recovery
of B`[·, j] follows easily.
Let us now recall that Cf [·, j, s] ∈ RSk(x) can be written as
∑k
r=1M
f [r, j, s]γr. Moreover, D
f
` [·, s]
lies in a repetition code, hence Df` [i, s] = λ`,s,f for some λ`,s,f ∈ Fq. Therefore, expressing
A`[·, j] =
d∑
r=1
∑
s,f
λ`,s,fM
f [r, j, s]
γr
in the basis {γ1, . . . ,γd} ⊂ Fnq of nested Reed-Solomon codes RSd(x) ⊇ RSk(x) allows us to retrieve
every scalar
∑
s,f λ`,s,fM
f [r, j, s], or equivalently, every
∑
s,f M
f [r, j, s]Df` [·, s] ∈ Fnq .
Finally, Equation (3) shows that for every 1 ≤ s ≤ n − k, the knowledge of B1[·, j], . . . ,Bk[·, j]
allows the user to retrieve a subset of k distinct symbols of Cf0 [·, j, s], which is equivalent to retrieving
M f0 [·, j, s]. Thus, she can finally obtain M f0 [·, j, ·].
Lemma 2. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ k. For every 1 ≤ ` ≤ j, for convenience we denote by
R`[·, j] := (R`[k − j + 1, j], . . . , R`[n, j]) ∈ Fn−k+jq .
Then, conditioned on (R1[·, j], . . . ,Rj [·, j]) and on∑
s,f
Mf [r, j, s]Df` [·, s], for all j + 1 ≤ r ≤ d, 1 ≤ ` ≤ j, (4)
the following are determined:
• the piece M f0 [·, j, ·] of the desired file;
• random vectors
∑
s,f M
f [r, j, s]Df` [·, s] ∈ Fn−k+jq for all 1 ≤ r, ` ≤ j.
Proof. Let us fix 1 ≤ ` ≤ j. In contrast with Lemma 1, we will deal with vectors of shorter length
n − k + j. In particular, we denote x′ = (xk−j+1, . . . , xn). Similarly, the user is able to build the
response vector R`[·, j] of length n− k + j given by
R`[·, j] := (R`[k − j + 1, j], . . . , R`[n, j]) = A`[·, j] +B`[·, j] ,
where A`[·, j] and B`[·, j] are defined as in Lemma 1. One can rewrite A`[·, j] ∈ Fn−k+jq as follows:
A`[·, j] =
∑
s,f
Df` [·, s] ?Cf [·, j, s]
=
∑
s,f
Df` [·, s] ?
(
d∑
r=1
Mf [r, j, s]γr
)
=
j∑
r=1
∑
s,f
Mf [r, j, s] Df` [·, s] ? γr +
d∑
r=j+1
∑
s,f
Mf [r, j, s] Df` [·, s] ? γr.
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Therefore, using vectors in (4) the user can build
A′`[·, j] :=
d∑
r=j+1
∑
s,f
Mf [r, j, s] Df` [·, s]
 ? γr.
Hence, she is able to construct
R′′` [·, j] := R`[·, j]−A′`[·, j] = (A`[·, j]−A′`[·, j]) +B`[·, j] .
As the basis {γ1, . . . ,γd} is ordered by degree, we see that A′′` [·, j] := A`[·, j]−A′`[·, j] lies in RSj(x′).
Indeed, each {γ1, . . .γj} must also be a basis of smaller RS codes. Also remark that once again, the
vector B`[·, j] ∈ Fn−k+jq is supported by [k+1, n]. Since [k−j+1, k] is an information set for RSj(x′),
the user can thus recover A′′` [·, j] and B`[·, j] from R′′` [·, j].
Similarly to Lemma 1, one can easily see that M f0 [·, j, ·] can be obtained from B1[·, j], . . . ,Bj [·, j].
Finally, A′`[·, j] and A′′` [·, j] allow to reconstruct A`[·, j]. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, the basis
{γ1, . . . ,γj} of RSj(x′) leads to the recovery of random elements
∑
s,f M
f [r, j, s]λ`,s,f ∈ Fq for every
1 ≤ r, ` ≤ j.
Theorem 1. The scheme proposed in Section III-C is secure against non-colluding servers. Its PIR rate
is:
RMBR =
3(n− k)(2d− k + 1)
6dn− 3nk + 3n− k2 + 1 .
Proof. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 ensure that the user retrieves the correct file Xf0 as long as the servers
S1, . . . , Sn follow the protocol described in Section III-C. Since the servers are assumed not to collude,
the only way a server Si can learn information about the identity f0 of the required file, is from its own
query matrix Q[i, ·]. Since the matrix Q[i, ·] is chosen such that it is statistically independent of f0, the
scheme is private. More precisely, since Q[i, ·] = D[i, ·] +E(f0)[i, ·] ∼D[i, ·], we have
H(f0 | Q[i, ·]) = H(f0 |D[i, ·]) = H(f0),
where H(·) denotes the entropy function.
Let us now compute the PIR rate. The file Xf0 consists of
(n− k)B = (n− k)(k(d− k) + k(k + 1)/2)
symbols over Fq. During step j, for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the user downloads k responses from each server
S1, . . . , Sn. Hence she gets a total of nk(d − k) symbols for all these steps. For columns 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
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the user downloads j responses from servers Sk−j+1, . . . , Sn, leading to a total of
∑k
j=1 j(n − k + j)
symbols for those steps. Therefore, we get the following PIR rate:
RMBR =
(n− k)
(
(d− k)k + k(k+1)2
)
(d− k)nk +∑kj=1 j(n− k + j) (5)
=
(n− k)
(
(d− k)k + k(k+1)2
)
(d− k)nk + (n− k)k(k+1)2 + k(k+1)(2k+1)6
=
3(n− k)(2d− k + 1)
6dn− 3nk + 3n− k2 + 1 .
Remark 1. As a function of n, k,B, the PIR rate given in Theorem 1 can be written as
RMBR =
1− kn
1− k(k+1)(k−1)6nB
. (6)
Indeed, starting from Equation (5) we get
RMBR =
(n− k)B
nB +
∑k
j=1 j(j − k)
=
(n− k)B
nB − k(k+1)(k−1)6
,
leading to the expected expression.
E. On the PIR rate
1) Comparison with the multi-file PIR scheme of Dorkson and Ng: Dorkson and Ng in [24] proposed
a PIR scheme over PM-MBR codes in the context of multi-file retrieval, i.e. any set of p ≥ 1 files
Xf0 , . . . ,Xfp−1 can be simultaneously retrieved privately. In the current work, retrieving p files remains
possible by iterating the 1-file PIR protocol p times. Notice that this routine achieves the same PIR rate
as the 1-file PIR scheme.
In the general case, the PIR rate obtained in [24] is R′ = pBdn , under the additional constraint that
n = pk + d. We notice that R′ can be reformulated as follows:
R′ =
n− d
k
· B
nd
=
n− d
n
· B
kd
.
Assume that k ≤ d < n, which is the case for non-degenerate PM-MBR codes. This implies that
n−d
n = 1− dn ≤ 1− kn and Bkd < 1, and therefore
R′ < 1− k
n
< RMBR ,
where RMBR is the PIR rate of the scheme we propose in the current work. We emphasize our improve-
ment upon [24] with the numerical and asymptotic analyses proposed in Figure 2.
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(a) PIR rate of both schemes, with a finite number of nodes n.
We here set n = 40 and k = 7, and we plot the PIR rate versus
d. For fixed values of n and k and varying k+1 ≤ d ≤ n−1,
the scheme in [24] allows only a few admissible values of p,
since n = pk + d must hold. The larger the p, the larger the
PIR rate of [24], but it remains bounded by the present scheme
for every admissible value of p.
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(b) PIR rate of both schemes, with an asymptotic number of
nodes n. Each curve represents a distinct value of k/n ∈
{0.1, . . . , 0.9}, and we plot the PIR rate versus d/n.
Fig. 2. Comparison between PIR rates of the multi-file PIR scheme in [24] and the PIR scheme in the present paper.
2) Comparison with the asymptotic capacities of scalar MDS codes: Since PM-MBR codes allow
to retrieve files by contacting only k nodes among n, it is somewhat relevant to compare the proposed
scheme with PIR schemes over [n, k] MDS-coded data. We can also motivate this comparison by the
following example.
Example 4. In the PIR scheme presented in Example 3, the queried file has size (n− k)B = 27, while
the user needs to download 18 + 18 + 10 + 4 = 50 symbols. Hence, the PIR rate is 27/50, which is
larger than 1 − k/n = 1/2, the PIR capacity of an [n, k] MDS code, but smaller than 1 − B/nd, the
PIR capacity of an [nd,B] MDS code.
However, in the MBR construction, d symbols are stored on a single server. Therefore, considering the
storage code as an [nd,B] linear code, a PIR protocol must resist to some sets of colluding nodes of size
d (also known as partial collusion). In this setting, we can compare our construction to the conjectured
PIR capacity 1− B+d−1nd of [nd,B] linear codes with full d-collusion [14]. In the current example, the
conjectured capacity is then 1/2, which is again below the achieved rate.
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Lemma 3. The PIR rate RMBR of the scheme from Theorem 1 satisfies:
1− k
n
≤ RMBR ≤ 1− B
nd
.
Proof. If 1 ≤ j ≤ k, it is clear that n− k+ j ≤ n. Using this trivial observation in Equation (5), we get
RMBR ≥ (n− k) ((d− k)k + k(k + 1)/2)
n(d− k)k + n∑kj=1 j = n− kn = 1− kn .
The right-hand-side inequality is a bit more technical to state. Using the expression of RMBR given in
Theorem 1, it is equivalent to prove that
∆ := (nd−B)(6dn− 3nk + 3n− k2 + 1)− 3(n− k)(2d− k + 1)nd
is non-negative. A computation shows that:
2∆ = (2nd− 2kd+ k2 − k)(6nd− 3nk + 3n− k2 + 1)− 6nd(n− k)(2d− k + 1)
= 6nd((2nd− 2kd+ k2 − k)− (n− k)(2d− k + 1))− (2nd− 2kd+ k2 − k)(k2 − 1 + 3nk − 3n)
= 6n2d(k − 1)− (2nd− 2kd+ k2 − k)(k − 1)(3n+ k + 1)
= (k − 1)[6n2d− (2nd− 2kd+ k2 − k)(3n+ k + 1)] .
If k = d, then we get 2∆ = k(k− 1)(k+ 1)(n− (k+ 1)) ≥ 0 as long as n ≥ k+ 1 which must hold
for non-degenerated MBR codes.
If d ≥ k + 1, as it is for a non-trivial regenerating code, then we get
2∆
k − 1 = d((k − 1)(4n+ 2k + 3) + 2n+ 2)− (k − 1)(k + 1)(3n+ k + 1)
≥ (k + 1)((k − 1)(4n+ 2k + 3) + 2n+ 2)− (k − 1)(k + 1)(3n+ k + 1)
≥ (k + 1)(k − 1)(n+ k + 2) + 2(k + 1)(n+ 1)
≥ 0 .
We can also model the n servers storing α = d symbols each as an nd-tuple of “virtual” or “sub”-
servers storing one symbol each. In this setting, some d-tuples of servers collude with one another. For
that reason, it is relevant to compare the PIR rate of this scheme with the (conjectured) capacity of a PIR
scheme for an [nd,B] MDS-coded storage system allowing collusions of servers of size up to α = d.
This conjectured capacity is 1− B+d−1nd [14]. Note that the assumption of full d-collusion is pessimistic
since in this setting, not any d servers can collude, rather there exist disjoint sets of colluding servers
that are known a priori, cf. [26].
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(b) PIR rate RMBR versus d when n = 40, assuming d =
2(k − 1).
Fig. 3. PIR rate versus d when n = 40. Comparison between the PIR rate of the scheme in the current work, the capacity
1− k/n of a PIR scheme for an [n, k] MDS coded storage system with no collusion, the capacity 1−B/nd of a PIR scheme
for an [nd,B] MDS coded storage system with no collusion, and the conjectured capacity 1− (B+d−1)/nd of a PIR scheme
for an [nd,B] MDS-coded storage system with full d collusion.
A comparison of the rate of the PIR scheme constructed in this paper with the other relevant capacity
expressions of PIR schemes discussed in this section is shown in Figure 3 for different values of n, k
and d. We can see that the achieved rate in our scheme is higher than the PIR capacity of an [n, k]
MDS code, and for a reasonably high value of d, the achievable PIR rate for the scheme described in
Section III-C. As explained before, the achieved rate is always lower than the PIR capacity of an [nd,B]
MDS code.
IV. A PIR SCHEME IN THE MSR SETTING
We consider a regenerating code C attaining the MSR point. As explained in Section II-D2, we restrict
our work on the setting d = 2k− 2 = 2α for simplicity. Hence C is also a linear code over Fq of length
nd = 2nα and dimension B = α(α+ 1).
A. System setup
Similarly to the MBR setting, we consider a storage system X of F files X1, . . . ,XF , each storing
B = α(α+1) information symbols. The symbols of the fileXf , 1 ≤ f ≤ F , are arranged into S = n−2α
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stripes, such that the message M f can be written
M f =
Mf [i, j, s], 1 ≤ i ≤ 2α1 ≤ j ≤ α
1 ≤ s ≤ S
 .
By construction of the MSR code C, for all 1 ≤ f ≤ F and all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ α, we have
M f [i, j, ·] = M f [j, i, ·] = M f [α+ i, j, ·] .
Moreover, for every j, s, f , the column M f [·, j, s] ∈ F2αq is encoded into a Reed-Solomon codeword
Cf [·, j, s] ∈ RS2α(x) by
Cf [·, j, s] =
2α∑
r=1
Mf [r, j, s]γr,
where we recall that {γ1, . . . ,γ2α} denotes a suitable basis for sequences of Reed-Solomon codes (see
Section II-A).
B. The PIR scheme
Assume the user wants to retrieve fileXf0 privately. We consider a 2α-tuple of queriesQ = (Q1, . . . ,Q2α)
having the following form for 1 ≤ ` ≤ 2α:
Q` =
Qf` [i, s], 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 ≤ s ≤ S
1 ≤ f ≤ F
 .
Once again, Q` does not depend on the column index j ∈ [1, α], preventing to leak information on the
requested file.
Generation of Q. Similar to the MBR setting, queries Q are defined by Q := D+E(f0) with D and
E(f0) defined as follows.
1) For every `, s, f , the random vector Df` [·, s] ∈ Fnq is a word picked uniformly at random from the
repetition code of length n.
2) The retrieval pattern E(f0) is defined by
E
(f0),f
` [i, s] =
 1 if f = f0 and n− i = `+ s− 2 (mod S),0 otherwise,
for every 1 ≤ ` ≤ 2α, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ s ≤ S and 1 ≤ f ≤ F .
Server responses to queries. Given a column 1 ≤ j ≤ α, only servers Si such that 2α−2j+1 ≤ i ≤ n
are required to send the subset of responses R`[i, j], for 1 ≤ ` ≤ 2j.
Reconstruction of Xf0 . The recovery is run columnwise, from column α down to 1. In every step
1 ≤ j ≤ α, the goal is to retrieve M f0 [·, j, ·] as well as some random vectors. The recovery procedure
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is identical to that of the first columns of the MBR case. Column α is retrieved using a classical PIR
protocol on MDS codes, as in [13]. Here, the underlying storage code is RS2α(x). Similarly to the MBR
case, the user retrieves pieces of the required file, along with some randomness. The collected symbols
from column α (randomness and information symbols) can be reused in column α− 1 to again retrieve
other pieces of the required file and associated randomness. This process is then repeated until retrieving
the information from column 1. This iterative process reduces the number of total downloaded symbols to
retrieve the required file Xf0 , and consequently reduces the PIR rate. We refer to Lemma 5 for technical
details.
We give a simple example to explain the scheme.
Example 5. We use the (6, 3, 4) PM-MSR regenerating code presented in Example 2, with α = 2. Files
are divided into S = n− 2α = 2 stripes, and the user sends 2α = 4 vectors of queries:
Query 1 Query 2 Query 3 Query 4
Server S1 u v w y
Server S2 u v w y
Server S3 u v w + ef0,1 y + ef0,2
Server S4 u v w + ef0,2 y + ef0,1
Server S5 u+ ef0,1 v + ef0,2 w y
Server S6 u+ ef0,2 v + ef0,1 w y
The vector ef0,s0 ∈ FF×(n−2α)q is the all zero vector with a single 1 in position (f0, s0), i.e., indicating
stripe s0 from file Xf0 . Vectors u,v,w,y ∈ FF×Sq are random vectors.
The servers project the data stored in column 2 on all the queries. Servers S1 and S2 do not respond
to any other queries. Servers S3, . . . , S6 project only the first 2 queries on the data stored in the first
column.
C. Proofs
For 1 ≤ j ≤ α, we define the 2j-dimensional code
Cj := RSj(x) + 〈xα〉 ? RSj(x) ⊆ Fnq .
Lemma 4. There exists a sequence I1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Iα ⊂ [1, n] such that, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ α, Ij is an
information set for the code Cj .
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Proof. We prove the result inductively. First notice that Cα = RS2α(x), hence one can choose any 2α-
subset for Iα. Then, it is sufficient to notice that for every 2 ≤ j ≤ α, we have Cj−1 ⊂ Cj . Hence, an
information set Ij for Cj contains an information set for Cj−1.
The previous lemma allows us to make the following assumption: after reordering the servers (i.e. the
evaluation points x), we can assume that Ij = [2α − 2j + 1, 2α] for every 1 ≤ j ≤ α. Moreover, we
define the code Aj ⊆ Fn−2α+2jq as the puncturing of Cj on its (2α− 2j) first coordinates. The code Aj
has length n−2α+ 2j and dimension 2j, and by the chosen order of coordinates, its 2j first coordinates
form an information set.
Lemma 5. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ α. For every 1 ≤ ` ≤ 2j, we denote
R`[·, j] := (R`[2α− 2j + 1, j], . . . , R`[n, j]) ∈ Fn−2α+2jq .
Then, conditioned on (R1[·, j], . . . ,R2j [·, j]) and on∑
s,f
Mf [r, j, s]Df` [·, s] , for all j + 1 ≤ r ≤ α, 1 ≤ ` ≤ 2j , (7)
the following is determined:
• the piece M f0 [·, j, ·] of the desired file;
• the random vectors
∑
s,f M
f [r, j, s]Df` [·, s] ∈ Fnq , for all 1 ≤ r ≤ 2α and every 1 ≤ ` ≤ 2j.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one of Lemma 2. Let us fix 1 ≤ ` ≤ j. The user can build
R`[·, j] := (R`[2α− 2j + 1, j], . . . , R`[n, j]) = A`[·, j] +B`[·, j] ,
where A`[·, j] and B`[·, j] are defined as in Lemma 1.
Denote J1 := [0, j − 1]∪ [α, α+ j − 1] and J2 := [0, 2α− 1] \ J1. Both J1 and J2 are publicly known
to the user and the servers, as they only depend on the parameters of the scheme.
Define γr := (xr2α−2j+1, . . . , x
r
n) ∈ Fn−2α+2jq , for 0 ≤ r ≤ 2α − 1. It is clear that {γr, r ∈ J1} is a
basis of the code Aj defined above. One can rewrite A`[·, j] ∈ Fn−2α+2jq as follows:
A`[·, j] =
∑
s,f
Df` [·, s] ?Cf [·, j, s]
=
∑
s,f
Df` [·, s] ?
(
d∑
r=1
Mf [r, j, s]γr
)
=
∑
r∈J1
∑
s,f
Mf [r, j, s] Df` [·, s] ? γr +
∑
r∈J2
∑
s,f
Mf [r, j, s] Df` [·, s] ? γr.
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Therefore, using random vectors given in (7), the vector
A′`[·, j] :=
∑
r∈J2
∑
s,f
Mf [r, j, s] Df` [·, s]
 ? γr
can be constructed by the user. Recall that for any file Xf ,
M f [r, j, ·] = M f [j, r, ·] = M f [α+ r, j, ·]
for every 1 ≤ r ≤ α. Hence, the user is able to construct
R′′` [·, j] := R`[·, j]−A′`[·, j] = (A`[·, j]−A′`[·, j]) +B`[·, j]
and, by definition of J1, we see that A′′` [·, j] := A`[·, j] − A′`[·, j] lies in Aj . We remark that, once
again, the vector B`[·, j] ∈ Fn−k+jq is supported on [2α + 1, n]. According to the discussion preceding
the lemma, the interval Ij = [2α−2j+1, 2α] is an information set for Cj . Therefore the user can recover
A′′` [·, j] and B`[·, j] from R′′` [·, j].
Finally, the recovery of M f0 [·, j, ·] and of random elements ∑s,f Mf [r, j, s]λ`,s,f is identical to
Lemma 2.
Theorem 2. The scheme proposed in Section IV-B is secure against non-colluding servers. Its PIR rate
is
RMSR =
3(n− 2α)
3n− 2α+ 2 .
Proof. We have seen in Lemma 5 that the proposed scheme reconstructs the correct file. Similarly to the
MBR case, the scheme is private if servers do not collude. Let us compute the PIR rate.
The desired file consists of (n − 2α)B = α(α + 1)(n − 2α) symbols. For column 1 ≤ j ≤ α, the
number of downloaded symbols is 2j × (n− 2α+ 2j). Hence the PIR rate of the scheme is given by
RMSR =
α(α+ 1)(n− 2α)∑α
j=1 2j(n− 2α+ 2j)
=
α(α+ 1)(n− 2α)
nα(α+ 1)− 4∑αj=1 j(α− j)
=
α(α+ 1)(n− 2α)
nα(α+ 1)− 23α(α+ 1)(α− 1)
=
3(n− 2α)
3n− 2α+ 2
= 1− 4α+ 2
3n− 2α+ 2 .
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Fig. 4. PIR rate versus α in the MSR case, for fixed n = 40. Recall that 2α = d = 2k − 2 must hold.
D. On the PIR rate in the MSR case
In our simplified setting, it must hold that α = d/2 = k − 1. The PIR rate of the proposed scheme is
then
RMSR = 1− 4α+ 2
3n− 2α+ 2 .
Dorkson and Ng [24] give a multi-file PIR scheme for the same MSR codes, with a PIR rate of α(n−d)αn =
1− d/n. We prove in the following lemma that the PIR rate of our construction improves upon this rate.
Lemma 6. Let 1 ≤ α ≤ n/2 and assume that n ≥ 6 or α ≥ 3. Then:
1− d
n
≤ RMSR ≤ 1− k
n
.
Proof. For the left-hand side inequality, we need to prove that d/n ≥ (2d+ 2)(3n− 2d+ 2). A simple
computation shows it is equivalent to (d− 2)(n− d) ≥ 0, which holds as long as α = d/2 ≥ 1.
Similarly, the right-hand side inequality RMSR ≤ 1− kn holds if and only if n(α−3)2 +(α+1)(α−1) ≥ 0,
which proves our result.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we construct PIR schemes for the product matrix constructions in the MBR and MSR
settings. The schemes use the symmetric properties of the PM codes in order to increase the PIR rate.
For the PM-MBR setting, we achieve a PIR rate that is better than 1 − k/n, i.e., larger than the PIR
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capacity of an [n, k] MDS coded storage system. As for the PM-MSR setting, we achieve a PIR rate
between 1− d/n, i.e., the PIR capacity of an [n, d] MDS code, and 1− k/n.
A possible further work on the topic would be to consider colluding servers. A natural idea is to
adapt the constructions of Freij-Hollanti et al. [14], [16], by replacing the repetition code where random
vectors Df` [·, s] are picked, by a Reed-Solomon code of higher dimension. However, the extraction of
the randomness — necessary to decrease the communication cost of our schemes — cannot be done as
easily as in the non-colluding case, because projected random symbols interfere with themselves.
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